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Graphical Models for Inference Under
Outcome-Dependent Sampling
Vanessa Didelez, Svend Kreiner and Niels Keiding
Abstract. We consider situations where data have been collected such
that the sampling depends on the outcome of interest and possibly fur-
ther covariates, as for instance in case-control studies. Graphical models
represent assumptions about the conditional independencies among the
variables. By including a node for the sampling indicator, assumptions
about sampling processes can be made explicit. We demonstrate how
to read off such graphs whether consistent estimation of the association
between exposure and outcome is possible. Moreover, we give sufficient
graphical conditions for testing and estimating the causal effect of ex-
posure on outcome. The practical use is illustrated with a number of
examples.
Key words and phrases: Causal inference, collapsibility, odds ratios,
selection bias.
1. INTRODUCTION
Nonrandom sampling poses a challenge for the
statistical analysis especially of observational data.
We focus here on the problem of outcome-dependent
sampling, where the inclusion of a unit into the sam-
ple depends, possibly in some indirect way, on the
outcome of interest, and possibly on further vari-
ables. The prime examples are case-control studies,
which have been surrounded by a long controversy,
but are now one of the most popular designs in ob-
servational epidemiology (Breslow, 1996). Any ob-
servational study based on volunteers is also poten-
tially sampled depending on the outcome, as the
willingness to participate can never be safely as-
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sumed to be independent of the outcome of inter-
est, for example, income. In other situations the
outcome-dependent sampling may not be obvious,
such as retrospective time-to-event studies (Wein-
berg, Baird and Rowland, 1993).
A superficial statistical analysis will typically be
biased under nonrandom sampling. It is therefore
important to investigate and understand the assump-
tions and limitations underlying valid inference in
such situations. Most approaches make very spe-
cific parametric modeling assumptions, including as-
sumptions about the selection mechanism, sometimes
accompanied by a sensitivity analysis (see, e.g., Co-
pas and Li, 1997, or McCullagh, 2008). As an al-
ternative, in this article we investigate the poten-
tial of graphical models to address the problem of
outcome-dependent sampling and restrict any as-
sumptions to be nonparametric and only in terms of
conditional independencies. A graphical model rep-
resents variables as nodes and uses edges between
nodes so that separations reflect conditional inde-
pendencies in the underlying model (see, e.g., Whit-
taker, 1990, or Lauritzen, 1996).
A key element of our proposed approach is to in-
clude a separate node as a binary selection indicator
in the graph so as to represent structural assump-
tions about how the sampling mechanism is related
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to exposure, outcome, covariates and possibly hid-
den variables. A similar idea appears in the works of
Cooper (1995), Cox and Wermuth (1996), Geneletti,
Richardson and Best (2009) and Lauritzen and
Richardson (2008). Our main results in this arti-
cle address the (graphical) characterization of situ-
ations where the typical null hypothesis of no asso-
ciation or no causal effect can be tested, and, when
all variables are categorical, where (causal) odds ra-
tios can be consistently estimated. These graphi-
cal rules do not require particular parametric con-
straints and essentially capture when the model is
collapsible over the selection indicator. While our re-
sults on testing are general, estimation is restricted
to odds ratios as these (or functions thereof) are the
only measures of association that do not depend on
the marginal distributions (Edwards, 1963; Altham,
1970) and for which results can be obtained without
specific parametric assumptions.
The outline of the article is as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 we review basic concepts of graphical models,
and highlight how a binary sampling node can be
included so as to make assumptions about the sam-
pling process explicit (Section 2.4). The correspond-
ing graphs can be constructed in different ways, for
instance in a prospective or retrospective manner
representing different types of assumptions. Section
3 revisits the notion of collapsibility, which is funda-
mental for being able to ‘ignore’ outcome-dependent
sampling. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 provide the central re-
sults that allow us to estimate an odds ratio (Corol-
lary 4) or test for an association (Theorem 6) under
outcome-dependent sampling. Section 3.5 illustrates
this with a data example. We then move on to causal
inference in Section 4, where we define a causal effect
as the effect of an intervention. We formalize this us-
ing intervention indicators, and adapt the graphical
representation by adding a corresponding decision
node yielding so-called influence diagrams (Dawid,
2002). In analogy to the associational case, Theorem
7 establishes (graphically verifiable) conditions un-
der which a prospective causal effect can be tested
or estimated from retrospective, that is, outcome-
dependent, data. In Section 5 we present new re-
sults that apply to less obvious cases of outcome-
dependent sampling (Theorems 8 and 9).
2. GRAPHICAL MODELS
We start with a brief overview of graphical mod-
els. Our notation follows closely that of Lauritzen
Fig. 1. Examples of undirected graphs.
(1996). A graph G = (V,E) with nodes or vertices
V and edges E is combined with a statistical model,
that is, a distribution P on a set of variables that are
identified with the nodes of the graph. The distribu-
tion P has to be such that the absence of an edge in
the graph represents a certain conditional indepen-
dence between the corresponding pair of variables.
Conditional independence of A and B given C is
denoted by A⊥⊥B|C (Dawid, 1979).
The type of graph dictates the specific conditional
independence induced by the absence of an edge.
A basic distinction is between undirected graphs,
directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) and chain graphs.
We review the former two but do not go into detail
for chain graphs.
2.1 Undirected Graphs
In an undirected graph G all edges are undirected,
represented by a–b. All nodes in V \{a} that have an
edge with a ∈ V form the boundary bd(a) of a. We
say that two sets of nodes A and B are separated
by a third set C if any path along the edges of the
graph between A and B includes vertices in C. In
particular, each set A is separated by its boundary
from all other nodes V \(bd(A) ∪ A). The induced
conditional independencies are as follows. For any
disjoint subsets A,B,C ⊂ V , the variables in A have
to be conditionally independent of those in B given
C whenever C separates A and B in the graph—
we then call P G-Markovian. As examples consider
the undirected graphs in Figure 1. In the left graph,
X ⊥⊥C|(B,Y ) as well as Y ⊥⊥B|(C,X). In the right
graph of Figure 1, for instance, B1 ⊥⊥ B2|(C,Y ) or
B1 ⊥⊥ B2|(C,X) showing that separating sets are
not necessarily unique.
We say that a subset C ⊂ V of the nodes of a
graph is complete if each pair of nodes in C is joined
by an edge. We further call such a complete C a
clique if adding any further node would destroy its
completeness; that is, a clique is a maximal complete
set of nodes. In Figure 1 the graph on the right has
cliques {B1,C},{B1,X},{X,Y } and {B2,C,Y }.
Let C be the set of all cliques in G. The above con-
ditional independence restrictions that are induced
by an undirected graph go hand in hand with a fac-
torization of the joint distribution in terms of these
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cliques. Assume p is the p.d.f. (or p.m.f. if discrete)
of the random vector XV = (X1, . . . ,XK) taking val-
ues xV = (x1, . . . , xK); then p is said to factorize ac-
cording to an undirected graph G if it can be written
as
p(xV ) =
∏
C∈C
φC(xC),(1)
where φC(·) are functions that depend on xV only
through its components in C.
In later sections we will also make use of the no-
tion of an induced subgraph GA, A⊂ V , obtained by
removing all nodes in V \A and edges involving at
least one node in V \A.
2.2 Directed Acyclic Graphs
Directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) represent differ-
ent sets of conditional independencies than undi-
rected graphs. They often seem more natural if one
thinks of a data generating process, that is, a way
in which the data could be simulated, but DAGs
can also be used to represent conditional indepen-
dencies other than for a generating process. More-
over, one could also use chain graphs (Frydenberg,
1990; Wermuth and Lauritzen, 1990) which repre-
sent again different sets of conditional independen-
cies; undirected graphs as well as DAGs are special
cases of chain graphs.
In DAGs all edges are directed, for example, a→
b, without forming any directed cycles. For a→ b
we say that a is a parent of b and b is a child of a.
This can be generalized to sets, for example, pa(A),
A⊂ V , denotes all the variables in V \A that are par-
ents of some variable in A, and similarly for the chil-
dren ch(A). Analogously we speak of descendants
de(A) of A, meaning all those nodes in V \A that
can be reached from some vertex in A following the
direction of the edges, while nondescendants nd(A)
are all other nodes (excluding A itself). Further, the
ancestors an(A) are defined as those nodes in V \A
from which we can reach some vertex in A following
the direction of the edges.
Fig. 2. DAG (left) representing A ⊥⊥ B and moral graph
(right) showing A⊥⊥upslope B|C.
Similarly to (1), a DAG also induces a factoriza-
tion of the joint density as follows:
p(x1, . . . , xK) =
K∏
k=1
p(xi|xpa(i)),(2)
where p(xi|xpa(i)) denotes the conditional density of
Xi given all its parent variables Xpa(i). A simple ex-
ample is given in Figure 2 (left): here the joint dis-
tribution factorizes as p(a, b, c) = p(a)p(b)p(c|a, b).
The factorization (2) is equivalent to the follow-
ing, graphically characterized conditional indepen-
dencies:
Xi ⊥⊥Xnd(i)\pa(i)|Xpa(i) ∀i ∈ V.(3)
For instance, in Figure 2 (left), A is a nondescendant
of B that has no parents, hence A⊥⊥ B is implied
by this DAG; there is no other (conditional) inde-
pendence in this particular DAG.
Even though the partial ordering imposed by the
direction of the edges on the variables X1, . . . ,XK
is often postulated to follow some causal or time
order, this does not automatically follow from the
represented conditional independencies (cf. Section
2.4). For instance p(a, b, c) = p(a)p(c|a)p(b|c) implies
the same conditional independencies as p(a, b, c) =
p(b)p(c|b)p(a|c), represented in the two graphs A→
C→B and A←C←B, respectively. In both cases
A⊥⊥B|C. These two graphs (or factorizations) are
called Markov equivalent, meaning that exactly the
same conditional independencies can be read off.
This implies that even if we believe there is an un-
derlying unknown causal or other kind of ordering,
then conditional independencies estimated from ob-
servational data on A,B,C cannot help to distin-
guish between these graphs nor tell us the causal
order. However, depending on the way in which the
variables are observed, how a study is conducted or
other considerations, it might seem more natural to
specify p(c|a) and p(b|c) than p(c|b) and p(a|c) (we
will come back to this below). Note that the DAG
of Figure 2 is not equivalent to the former two as it
induces a different independence, A⊥⊥B.
2.3 Selection Effect and Moralization
All conditional independencies that can be de-
duced from (3) are given by graph separation for
DAGs. One can either use the d-separation criterion
(Verma and Pearl, 1988) or the moralization crite-
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rion (Lauritzen et al., 1990). The latter is described
in detail next.1
The moralization criterion is used to determine
the conditional independencies of a DAG G in a
collection of undirected graphs using ordinary graph
separation. These are the moral graphs on subgraphs
of G. Let A⊂ V and let An(A) = an(A) ∪A; then
the corresponding moral graph GmAn(A) is given by
adding undirected edges between nodes of An(A)
that have a common child in An(A) and then turn-
ing all remaining directed edges into undirected ones.
Any conditional independence that is induced by
factorization (2) can be read off GmAn(A) for some
A ⊂ V . More specifically, if we want to establish
whether A ⊥⊥ B|C, then we check for graph sepa-
ration in the undirected graph GmAn(A∪B∪C). In Fig-
ure 2, if we want to investigate whether A⊥⊥B, we
draw the moral graph GmAn(A∪B) which consists of
the two unconnected nodes A and B, with node C
removed as it is not in An(A ∪B), confirming that
A ⊥⊥ B as shown earlier. However, if we want to
check whether A ⊥⊥ B|C, then we draw the moral
graph GmAn(A∪B∪C) shown on the right in Figure 2
and see that this independence is not implied by the
graphical model.
The “moral edges” represent what is known in epi-
demiology as selection or stratification (Greenland,
2003; Hernan, Herna´ndez-Dı´az and Robins, 2004): if
A and B are marginally independent but C depends
on both of them, as represented by the DAG in Fig-
ure 2, then conditioning on C typically induces a de-
pendence between A and B. This can easily be seen
as the factorization p(a, b, c) = p(a)p(b)p(c|a, b) does
not imply a factorization of p(a, b|c) = p(a|c)p(b|c).
As an example assume that A is (binary) exposure
to a risk factor and B is some disease indicator that
is entirely unrelated to A. Further assume that the
data are obtained from a database C, with C = 1 if
an individual is found in that database and C = 0
otherwise. If, for some reason, individuals who are
exposed are more likely to be in the database as well
as individuals who are ill, then we typically find an
association between A and B in the sample from
that database because we condition on C = 1. This
may, for example, happen when it is a database for
1The two criteria, d-separation and moralization, are en-
tirely equivalent and readers more familiar with the former
can verify all conditional independencies in the following with
d-separation.
Fig. 3. DAG (left) with moral graphs on An(B ∪X) (mid-
dle) and on An(B ∪X ∪ S) (right).
a different disease for which A is a risk factor and
which is associated with B (cf. Berkson, 1946). In
this example, the marginal association of A and B is
the target of inference, but cannot be obtained from
the available data, so that this phenomenon is often
called selection (or stratification) bias. Note that in
econometrics the term selection bias is also used to
denote systematic (as opposed to randomized) selec-
tion into treatment or exposure (Heckman, 1979),
which in epidemiology would rather be called con-
founding.
The selection effect is equally relevant when con-
ditioning is not on a common child of nodes A and
B but on any descendant of such a common child
as this indirectly provides information on all ances-
tors; for example, in Figure 3 (left), X ⊥⊥ B but
X ⊥⊥upslope B|S because S carries some information on
Y and Y is a common child of B and X . Figure
3 shows the corresponding moral graphs GmAn(B∪X)
(middle) and GmAn(B∪X∪S) (right) for checking these
two conditional independence statements.
2.4 Graphical Representation of Sampling
Mechanisms
We now turn to the question of how to represent
with graphical models that the units in the dataset
have possibly been sampled depending on some of
the variables relevant to the analysis. The nodes in-
clude X , the exposure or treatment, and Y , the re-
sponse. Additional nodes are used to represent fur-
ther relevant variables, for example, in particular a
binary variable S indicating whether the unit is sam-
pled, S = 1, or not, S = 0. This use of a sampling
indicator has also been proposed by Cooper (1995),
Cox andWermuth (1996), Geneletti, Richardson and
Best (2009) and Lauritzen and Richardson (2008).
Also, we may include a set of covariates C.
The graph is normally constructed based on a
combination of subject matter background knowl-
edge, especially concerning the sampling mechanism,
and testable implications. Some examples for differ-
ent sampling mechanisms are depicted in Figure 4.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 4. DAGs for different sampling processes: (a) inde-
pendent sampling, (b) stratified (on covariates C) sampling,
(c) case-control sampling, (d) case-control matched by C.
Note that all the graphs in Figure 4 could as well
be undirected (replacing every directed edge by an
undirected one) and still represent the same con-
ditional independencies, that is, S ⊥⊥ (X,Y,C) in
(a), S ⊥⊥ (X,Y )|C in (b), S ⊥⊥ (X,C)|Y in (c) and
S ⊥⊥X|(Y,C) in (d).
For a given set of variables we speak of outcome-
dependent sampling if Y and S are dependent what-
ever subset of the remaining variables we condi-
tion on, such as in (c) and (d) of Figure 4. The
problem created by outcome-dependent sampling is
that, first, p(y) cannot be identified as the obser-
vations are only informative for p(y|S = 1), and sec-
ond, that conditioning on S = 1 might create associ-
ations that are not present in the target population
due to the selection effect as explained in Section 2.3
(Hernan, Herna´ndez-Dı´az and Robins, 2004). For a
DAG to represent the selection effect, it has to be
constructed in a prospective way, as in Figure 4 and
as illustrated in the following example.
Example. In Figure 3, assume that B and C are
baseline covariates like B = sex and C = age, while
X is exposure to a risk factor (e.g., loud music) that
possibly changes with age but not with sex and Y
is a disease (e.g., hearing loss) that is affected by
all previous variables. Assume further that we se-
lect individuals into our study, S = 1, based on age
and disease status (as would be the case in a case-
control study matched by age); hence S depends
on C and Y . A DAG on the partially ordered vari-
ables ({B,C},X,Y,S) would reflect the time order
in which the variables are assumed to be realized,
and would enable us to express, for instance, the as-
sumption that B ⊥⊥X as shown in Figure 3. It also
allows us to represent that the sampling induces de-
pendencies that are not present marginally, that is,
the selection effect. The DAG in Figure 3, for in-
stance, implies that the joint density of all variables
factorizes as
p(s, y, b, c, x)
= p(s|y, c)p(y|x, b, c)p(x|c)p(b)p(c).
Fig. 5. Representing the sampling order: DAG (left) with
moral graph on An(B ∪X ∪C ∪ Y ) (right).
Data from a case-control study, however, only ad-
mits inference on the conditional distribution given
S = 1 which is given by
p(y, b, c, x|S = 1)
(4)
=
p(S = 1|y, c)p(y|x, b, c)p(x|c)p(b)∑
y,c p(S = 1|y, c)p(c)p(y|c)
.
Marginalizing this over Y shows that there are no
necessary independencies among {X,B,C} condi-
tional on S = 1 confirming that {X,B,C} must be
complete in GmAn{X,B,C,S} as in the right graph of
Figure 3.
As an alternative to the prospective view, one
could decide to represent the sampling process, that
is, the order imposed by the sampling which will be
retrospective under outcome-dependent sampling; in
a case-control study, for instance, the response Y is
sampled first and hence the remaining variables are
conditional on the response.
Example continued. Continuing the above ex-
ample, choosing the sampled units (S = 1) based
on age and disease status partially reverses the or-
der to be (S,{C,Y },{B,X}). Conditional indepen-
dence test on the retrospective data might reveal
that X ⊥⊥ B|(C,Y ) which can be represented as
in the DAG in Figure 5 (cf. moral graph on the
right). While this conditional independence can be
tested from case-control data, the marginal inde-
pendence B ⊥⊥X postulated in Figure 3 cannot be
tested from case-control data due to the properties
of (4). (The latter could, however, be checked ap-
proximately, when the disease is rare, using only the
controls.)
A DAG reflecting the sampling order allows us
to encode conditional independencies given that a
unit is sampled. While this makes it typically more
difficult to include any subject-specific background
knowledge about the data generating process in the
formulation of the graph, it might result in a model
that fits the data better and still provides consistent,
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and simpler, estimates of the parameter we are in-
terested in. For a causal analysis, however, where we
want to be able to express prior causal assumptions,
it is crucial that the graph reflects the prospective
view (see Section 4.1). In particular we want to en-
code which variables are potentially affected by an
external change in the exposure status X by rep-
resenting these as descendants of X in the graph.
The causal interpretation of DAGs will be discussed
in more detail in Section 4; until then we focus on
graphs representing conditional independencies.
3. COLLAPSIBILITY
Roughly speaking, collapsibility means that infer-
ence can be carried out on a subset of the variables,
that is, after marginalizing over others (an exact def-
inition for odds ratios is given below). Typically col-
lapsibility is exploited to reduce dimensionality and
computational effort, as it enables us to pool sub-
groups. In our context collapsibility is relevant for
the opposite reason: all that we have is a subgroup,
namely the sampled population; but we want the
associations found in this subgroup to be valid for
the whole target population.
In this section we focus on the odds ratio as a
measure of association. This is motivated by the
fact that the odds ratio does not depend on the
marginal distribution of Y , which is potentially af-
fected by the sampling process, this also being the
main reason why odds ratios are typically used for
case-control data. We revisit general results on col-
lapsibility of odds ratios, including their graphical
versions, and then modify these to deal with the
particular problem of outcome-dependent sampling.
Note that the results concerning odds ratios given
next are closely linked to graphical log-linear models
(Darroch et al., 1980; Lauritzen, 1996, Chapter 4).
3.1 Conditional Odds Ratios
Define the conditional odds ratio ORY X(C = c)
(in short we also write ORY X(C)) for binary Y and
binary X given C = c as
p(Y = 1|X = 1,C = c)p(Y = 0|X = 0,C = c)
p(Y = 0|X = 1,C = c)p(Y = 1|X = 0,C = c)
.
It is straightforward to generalize this for the case
where Y and X have more than two categories.
We might then consider a collection of (conditional)
odds ratios comparing the probabilities for Y = y
versus a reference category Y = 0 for values of X ,
say X = x versus X = 0. This collection of odds ra-
tios fully characterizes the (conditional) dependence
between X and Y and is, vice versa, fully deter-
mined by the corresponding interaction terms of a
log-linear model. The results given below can there-
fore easily be extended to the case of more than two
categories.
3.2 General Results
It is well known that the conditional odds ratio
ORY X(C) is not necessarily the same as when we
collapse over C, that is, as the marginal ORY X ,
even if ORY X(C = c) =ORY X(C = c
′) for all c 6= c′.
Though this property is at the heart of most def-
initions of collapsibility, there are some subtleties
giving rise to various definitions of, and different
conditions that are sufficient and sometimes neces-
sary for, collapsibility (Bishop, Fienberg and Hol-
land, 1975; Whittemore, 1978; Shapiro, 1982; Davis,
1986; Ducharme and Lepage, 1986; Wermuth, 1987;
Geng, 1992; Guo, Geng and Fung, 2001). Here we
define collapsibility as follows.
Definition 1. Consider two binary variables X
and Y and disjoint sets of further variables B and
C. We say that the odds ratio ORY X(B,C) given
B and C is collapsible over B if ORY X(B = b,C =
c) = ORY X(B = b
′,C = c) = ORY X(C = c), for all
b 6= b′.
Note that in the above definition as well as in all
the following results, the covariates C can be of arbi-
trary measurement level, while X , Y and the covari-
ates we consider to collapse over, B, are categorical.
Collapsibility can then be ensured as follows.
Theorem 2. Sufficient conditions for the condi-
tional odds ratio ORY X(B,C) to be collapsible over
B are:
(i) Y ⊥⊥B|(C,X) or
(ii) X ⊥⊥B|(C,Y ).
Proof. This follows from the work of Whitte-
more (1978). 
Remarks. (a) The conditions in Theorem 2 are
necessary if B is a single binary variable (Whitte-
more, 1978).
(b) The conditions in Theorem 2 also ensure, and
are necessary for, strong collapsibility which posits
that the equality holds for any newly defined B′ ob-
tained by merging categories of B (Ducharme and
Lepage, 1986; Davis, 1986).
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The conditions in Theorem 2 are not necessary;
the following corollary gives a more general result.
Corollary 3. Assume that B can be partitioned
into (B1, . . . ,BK), and let B¯
k+1 = (Bk+1, . . . ,BK).
If Bk satisfies for each k = 1, . . . ,K, either:
(i) Y ⊥⊥Bk|(C,X, B¯
k+1) or
(ii) X ⊥⊥Bk|(C,Y, B¯
k+1),
then ORY X(B,C) is collapsible over B.
Proof. With Theorem 2, ORY X(Bk, . . . ,BK ,C)
is collapsible over Bk, k = 1, . . . ,K. Hence we can
consecutively collapse over B1, . . . ,BK . 
The conditions of Theorem 2, generalized in Corol-
lary 3, can be checked graphically as they corre-
spond to simple separations in graphical models, re-
gardless whether an undirected graph, a DAG or a
chain graph is used to model the data. We consider
the case of undirected graphs next; these could also
be the moral graphs derived from DAGs or chain
graphs.
Example. When B is not partitioned, the graph-
ical equivalents of the two conditions in the above
corollary are given in Figure 6, where each of the
graphs could have fewer edges but not more. An ex-
ample where B consists of B = {B1,B2} and is col-
lapsible is given in Figure 1 (right); B1 satisfies (i)
and B2 satisfies (ii) of Corollary 3. The conditions of
Theorem 2 can easily be checked on DAGs as well.
For instance, in Figure 7, the graph in (a) satisfies
(i) and (b) satisfies (ii) of the theorem (their moral
graphs are exactly those in Fig. 6). In contrast, (c)
cannot be collapsed over B as the moral graph in (d)
shows that neither B ⊥⊥ Y |(X,C) nor B ⊥⊥X|(Y,C)
holds in general. Note that the marginal indepen-
dence X ⊥⊥ B in this DAG does not help with re-
spect to collapsing the odds ratio over B.
Theorem 2 implies that even if we ignore B we can
still obtain consistent estimates for the conditional
odds ratio. However, it does not ensure that the ac-
tual value of the ML-estimate of ORY X(C) is the
same in the model where B is ignored as opposed to
Fig. 6. Left graph satisfies (i), right graph satisfies (ii) of
Corollary 3.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 7. Graphs (a) and (b) satisfy Theorem 2, while graph
(c) violates the conditions [moral graph in (d)].
when B is included; this is another type of collapsi-
bility (cf. Asmussen and Edwards, 1983, Lauritzen,
1982, and the discussion by Kreiner, 1987; for DAGs
see Kim and Kim, 2006 and Xie and Geng, 2009; for
chain graphs Didelez and Edwards, 2004).
3.3 Collapsibility Under Outcome-Dependent
Sampling
Now, we investigate collapsibility over S because
in the available data we have S = 1, so all we can es-
timate is necessarily conditional on S = 1. Hence, we
want to ensure that our estimate for ORY X(C,S =
1) applies to the whole target population, that is, is
consistent for ORY X(C).
Corollary 4. The conditional odds ratio
ORY X(C,S) is collapsible over S if and only if Y ⊥⊥
S|(C,X) or X ⊥⊥ S|(C,Y ).
Proof. This follows from Theorem 2 and note
(a) (see Whittemore, 1978). 
Similarly to Geneletti, Richardson and Best (2009),
we can call a set of variables C satisfying Corol-
lary 4 bias-breaking because it allows us to estimate
ORY X(C) consistently. As addressed in Section 2.3,
conditioning on S when no such C can be found and
S depends on both X and Y will typically induce
an association even when there is no association be-
tween X and Y , marginally or conditionally on co-
variates; and if there is an association between X
and Y , then conditioning on S will typically change
this association so that estimates based on the se-
lected data may be biased.
Example continued. In both DAGs, Figures
3 and 5, we can collapse ORY X(B,C,S) over S as
X ⊥⊥ S|(B,C,Y ). We can also collapse, in both
graphs, ORY X(C,S) over S as X ⊥⊥ S|(C,Y ).
A consequence of Corollary 4 is that in a typical
matched case-control study, the exposure-response
odds ratio is only collapsible over the sampling if we
condition on the matching variables, even if these
are not marginally associated with exposure. This
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Fig. 8. DAG for a matched (on B) case-control study (left)
and moral graph (right).
is illustrated in Figure 8, where sampling depends
on the outcome Y as well as on a matching variable
B, while X ⊥⊥ B. Here, we cannot collapse over S
if B is ignored, as neither X ⊥⊥ S|Y (as can be seen
from the moral graph, where the common child Y
induces an additional edge between X and B open-
ing a path to S) nor obviously Y ⊥⊥ S|X . However,
X ⊥⊥ S|(B,Y ) so that the odds ratio is collapsible
over S if it is conditional on B.
In addition to collapsing over S, we might want
to reduce dimensionality of covariates, for exam-
ple, to improve stability of estimates of odds ra-
tios (Robinson and Jewell, 1991). This is possible
if the set of covariates can be written as (B,C)
such that ORY X(B,C,S) is collapsible over S and
B in a way such that an estimate for ORY X(C,S =
1) is consistent for ORY X(B,C). The following is
straightforward from Theorem 2 and assumes that
there is outcome-dependent sampling, that is, Y ⊥
⊥upslope S|(B,C,X) so that, unlike Corollary 4, the next
corollary is not symmetric in X and Y .
Corollary 5. The odds ratio ORY X(B,C,S)
is collapsible over S, over (B,S) and over B if X ⊥
⊥ S|(Y,B,C) and:
(i) X ⊥⊥B|(Y,C) or
(ii) Y ⊥⊥B|(X,C) and X ⊥⊥ S|(Y,C).
Proof. First note that X ⊥⊥ S|(Y,B,C) yields
ORY X(B,C,S) collapsible over S. For part (i) addi-
tionally, X ⊥⊥B|(Y,C) yields ORY X(B,C) collapsi-
ble over B by Theorem 2. Both conditional indepen-
dencies together imply that X ⊥⊥ S|(Y,C) which fi-
nally yields ORY X(C,S) collapsible over S, so that
all these are equal to ORY X(C). For part (ii) we see
that ORY X(B,C) is collapsible over B due to Y ⊥⊥
B|(X,C) and we further have that ORY X(C,S) is
collapsible over S due to X ⊥⊥ S|(Y,C). This yields
the desired result. 
The conditions of Corollary 5 can again be checked
on graphical models by corresponding separations;
see Figure 9. As before, if B can be appropriately
partitioned, Corollary 5 can be applied successively
to the subsets Bk. When DAGs are used to check
Fig. 9. Illustrations of Corollary 5: left graph satisfies
X ⊥⊥ S|(Y,B,C), middle graph satisfies condition (i) and
right graph satisfies condition (ii).
Corollary 5, then the moral graph(s) have to be
identical to or have fewer edges than those in Figure
9. The DAGs in Figures 3 and 5 serve as examples
for the prospective and retrospective approaches, re-
spectively. From both we infer that we can collapse
over S, but only the second one also satisfies (i) of
Corollary 5. In contrast it can be seen from Fig-
ure 3 that the conditions (i) and (ii) of Corollary 5
will not be satisfied in a DAG that represents the
prospective view and where B as well as X point at
Y .
3.4 Testability of the Null Hypothesis
In general data situations, for example, when Y is
continuous, the odds ratio is not necessarily an ap-
propriate measure of dependence. Other measures
are typically not identified under outcome-dependent
sampling without further assumptions. However, a
result analogous to Theorem 2 can still be obtained
if we restrict ourselves to the question whether the
(conditional) independence of X and Y , possibly
given covariates C, can still be tested under outcome-
dependent sampling. This conditional independence
is often the null hypothesis of interest.
Theorem 6. If S ⊥⊥ Y |(C,X) or S ⊥⊥X|(C,Y ),
then
Y ⊥⊥X|C ⇐⇒ Y ⊥⊥X|(C,S = 1).
Proof. By the properties of conditional inde-
pendence (Dawid, 1979) we have that Y ⊥⊥X|C to-
gether with S ⊥⊥ Y |(C,X) (or S ⊥⊥ X|(C,Y )) im-
mediately implies Y ⊥⊥X|(C,S). Now assume that
Y ⊥⊥X|(C,S = 1) and S ⊥⊥ Y |(C,X); then p(y|x, c) =∑
s p(y|s,x, c)p(s|x, c) =
∑
s p(y|S = 1, c)p(s|x, c)
which is just p(y|S = 1, c). If instead S ⊥⊥X|(C,Y ),
an analogous argument yields p(x|y, c) = p(x|S =
1, c). This completes the proof. 
Hence, under the assumptions of Theorem 6 we
can test the null hypothesis of no (conditional) as-
sociation between exposure and response even un-
der outcome-dependent sampling by any appropri-
ate test for Y ⊥⊥X|(C,S = 1). Note that S has to
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satisfy the same conditions as for collapsibility of the
odds ratio in Theorem 2; this can be explained by
the one-to-one relation between (conditional) inde-
pendence and vanishing mixed derivative measures
of interaction (Whittaker, 1990, page 35) which are
a generalization of odds ratios to continuous distri-
butions.
3.5 Application: Hormone Replacement Therapy
(HRT) and Transient Cerebral Ischemia
(TCI)
We illustrate the above with a simplified version
of the analysis of Pedersen et al. (1997). The data
are from a case-control study, where the disease of
interest is transient cerebral ischemia (TCI ) and the
main risk factor is use of hormone replacement ther-
apy (HRT ). Controls are matched by age. Further,
smoking status (Smo), occupation (Occ) and his-
tory of other thromboembolic disorders (THist) are
included. All covariates here are categorical; in par-
ticular HRT is measured with categories “never”
(the reference category), “former,” “oestrogen” and
“combined.” The target of inference is the TCI –
HRT odds ratio conditional on all covariates. Un-
der what additional assumptions this can be given a
causal interpretation will be addressed explicitly in
the next section.
Assume the conditional independencies represented
in the DAG in Figure 10. The additional knowledge
that the actual study design is case-control matched
by age is easily included by drawing arrows from Age
and TCI into the additional node S, as in Figure 11.
Note that the assumptions implied by the subgraph
on the covariates are supported by the data from
the controls only and extrapolated to hold for the
whole population.
The moral graph on all variables is shown in Fig-
ure 12. This represents the conditional independence
structure that we would expect to see in the data
(i.e., conditional on S = 1). Note that a particular
feature of the age matching is that TCI ⊥⊥Age|S =
1 but as this is not necessarily the case for S = 0 we
Fig. 10. Prospective model for HRT–TCI example.
Fig. 11. DAG as in Figure 10 but now including selection
node S to reflect matched case-control sampling.
have to leave the edge TCI –Age in the moral graph.
(It is clear that the TCI –Age odds ratio cannot be
estimated from case-control data matched by age;
formally, it is not collapsible over S.)
It is obvious from the moral graph as well as from
the design of the study that, given TCI and Age, all
other variables are independent of the sampling in-
dicator S. In particular HRT ⊥⊥ S|(TCI ,Age,Occ,
Smo,THist) so that Corollary 4 is satisfied, mean-
ing that the conditional TCI –HRT odds ratio (given
all covariates) based on the selected sample is con-
sistent for the one in the population. In addition
we see that B = Occ is independent of TCI given
Age, Smo, THist and HRT so that condition (ii) of
Corollary 5 holds and we can ignore the occupation
of a person when estimating the conditional odds
ratio between TCI and HRT .
The actual calculation of the desired odds ratio
can be carried out by fitting a log-linear model on
the subgraph of Figure 12 excluding the selection
node S (Darroch, Lauritzen and Speed, 1980; Lau-
ritzen, 1996, Chapter 4). The desired conditional
TCI –HRT odds ratio is a function of the interac-
tion parameters in this model. For this dataset, we
obtain the log (conditional) odds ratios given in Ta-
ble 1 (there is no evidence that these are different in
the subgroups defined by the conditioning variables
Age, THist , Smo).
Earlier we assumed that the conditional TCI –
HRT odds ratio given all other covariates is the tar-
get of interest. If for some reason instead one wants
Fig. 12. Moral graph on all nodes of Figure 11.
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Table 1
Conditional odds ratio between HRT and TCI given {Age,
THist, Smo} based on separations in the DAG of Figure 11
HRT level log-OR (stdev) OR
Never Reference
Former 0.64 (0.16) 1.90
Oestrogen 0.73 (0.21) 2.07
Combined 0.26 (0.19) 1.29
to condition only on a subset of {Occ,Smo,THist ,
Age}, this is still collapsible over S as long as Age
is included in that subset.
An alternative approach is to use a DAG that
factorizes retrospectively according to the sampling
process so that S (and hence TCI and Age) are the
initial variables, taking into account that observa-
tions are conditional on being sampled in the first
place. Assume the conditional independencies repre-
sented in the DAG in Figure 13 which is supported
by the data. Collapsibility over S (given the covari-
ates) is of course still satisfied as this is implied by
the design and still reflected in the model assump-
tions encoded by the graph.
From the moral graph in Figure 14 we now have
that HRT is conditionally independent of THist
given the remaining variables so that condition (i)
of Corollary 5 is satisfied with B =THist . The con-
ditional TCI –HRT odds ratio given Occ, Smo, Age
estimated from the case-control data is now consis-
tent for the desired odds ratio in the target popula-
tion. The results are similar to the first model as can
be seen from Table 2. They are not exactly the same
as the model assumptions of Figures 11 and 13 are
indeed different, but they are both consistent, under
their respective model, for the same odds ratio given
all covariates.
A standard analysis based on a logistic regres-
sion of TCI on explanatory variables Age,Occ,Smo,
THist ,HRT implicitly assumes the model in Figure
15, that is, all covariates are parents of TCI . While
Fig. 13. DAG reflecting the sampling process for the
HRT–TCI example.
Fig. 14. Moral graph for Figure 13.
Table 2
Conditional odds ratio between HRT and TCI given {Age,
Occ, Smo} based on separations in the DAG of Figure 13
HRT level log-OR (stdev) OR
Never Reference
Former 0.66 (0.16) 1.93
Oestrogen 0.74 (0.21) 2.10
Combined 0.28 (0.19) 1.32
the logistic regression does not make assumptions
about the relations between the covariates, we have
drawn the graph assuming they are mutually in-
dependent. This is to demonstrate that the moral
graph, given in Figure 16, in any case has all covari-
ates forming a complete subgraph, that is, there are
no conditional independencies given TCI . The re-
sults can therefore be different from the above anal-
yses, as conditional independencies involving the co-
variates cannot be exploited to collapse over either
Occ or THist . Adjusting for more covariates than
necessary can lead to larger standard errors in logis-
Fig. 15. Graphical assumptions implicit in a logistic regres-
sion.
Fig. 16. Moral graph for Figure 15.
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Table 3
Conditional odds ratio between HRT and TCI given {Age,
Occ, Smo, THist} from a logistic regression
HRT level log-OR (stdev) OR
Never Reference
Former 0.66 (0.16) 1.93
Oestrogen 0.76 (0.21) 2.14
Combined 0.28 (0.19) 1.32
tic regressions (see Robinson and Jewell, 1991), but
this happens not to be the case here; see Table 3.
In a more realistic analysis there will be more vari-
ables to be taken into account, such as menopause,
other medical conditions (hypertension, diabetes,
heart diseases) and body mass index (see Peder-
sen et al., 1997), so that logistic regression produces
larger standard errors. The graphical approach based
on Corollary 5 can help to reduce the set of covari-
ates to be adjusted for.
4. CAUSAL EFFECTS OF INTERVENTIONS
So far we have regarded the conditional odds ratio
given all covariates as the target measure of associa-
tion between X and Y . However, in many situations
one is interested in the causal effect of X on Y , not
just the association. A causal effect is meant to rep-
resent the effect that manipulations or interventions
in X have on Y , as opposed to the mere observation
of different X values. Hence we define the causal ef-
fect formally as the effect of an intervention. Our
approach goes back to the work of Spirtes, Glymour
and Scheines (1993), Pearl (1993) and is detailed
in the article by Dawid (2002) (see also Lauritzen,
2000; Dawid and Didelez, 2010). We define an in-
dicator σX for an intervention in X , where σX in-
dicates either that X is being set to a value x ∈ X
in the domain of X , or that X arises naturally. In
the former case we write σX = x, x ∈X , and in the
latter σX =∅. More precisely,
p(x′|W ;σX = x) = δ{x= x
′},(5)
where W can be any set of additional variables and
δ is the indicator function. Hence X is indepen-
dent of any other variable when σX = x. In con-
trast, p(x′|W ;σX = ∅) is the conditional distribu-
tion of X given W that we observe when no in-
tervention takes place, that is, if X arises natu-
rally. More generally one may be interested in other
types of interventions, for example, where (5) is a
probability or depends on W (Dawid and Didelez,
2010; Didelez et al., 2006), but we do not consider
these in more detail here. The above approach is re-
lated to the potential outcomes framework (Rubin,
1974, 1978; Robins, 1986), in that the distribution
of the outcome Y under an intervention, p(y|σX =
x), corresponds to the distribution of the poten-
tial outcome Yx. A comparison of different causal
frameworks can be found in the work of Didelez and
Sheehan (2007b). We also call the situation σX =∅
the observational regime and the situation σX = x,
for some x ∈ X , the experimental or interventional
regime.
4.1 Influence Diagrams and Causal DAGs
The indicator σX must be regarded as a decision
variable or parameter, not as a random variable and
hence every statement about the system under in-
vestigation must be made conditional on the value
of σX . We will use conditional independence state-
ments of the type “A is independent of σX given B,”
or A⊥⊥ σX |B, meaning that the conditional distri-
bution of A given B is the same under observation
and any setting ofX . With this notion of conditional
independence applied to the intervention indicator,
we can then also include σX into our DAG represen-
tation of a data situation in order to encode which
variables are conditionally independent of σX in the
above sense. As σX is not a random variable but a
decision variable it is graphically represented in a
box and the resulting DAG is called an influence di-
agram (Dawid, 2002); cf. Figure 17 for an example.
The following points are important when construct-
ing an influence diagram.
(1) As the decision to intervene in X immediately
affects its distribution, σX has to be a graph parent
of X , while σX itself has no parents as it is a decision
node.
(2) Hence, any variables that are nondescendants
of σX are assumed independent of σX , that is, they
Fig. 17. Influence diagram for TCI example, prospectively.
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are not affected by an intervention in X . Such vari-
ables are often called “pre-treatment” or “baseline”
covariates, such as age, gender, etc. Figure 17, for
instance, encodes the assumption that the distribu-
tion of age, occupation, smoking status and prior
thromboembolic disorders does not change if HRT
is manipulated, while TCI is potentially affected.
Thus, by representing variables as nondescendants
or descendants of σX we can explicitly distinguish
between variables that are known a priori not to
be affected by an intervention in X and those that
are. It is therefore not sensible to add such an inter-
vention node to a retrospective graph such as Fig-
ure 13 as important prior knowledge about what is
and is not potentially affected by an intervention
in X could then not be represented. Retrospective
graphs encode a different set of assumptions that
can be used to justify collapsibility as illustrated in
Section 3.5 in order to apply condition (i) of Corol-
lary 5, for instance.
(3) Finally, X being the only child of σX encodes
the assumption that variables that are potentially
affected by an intervention (i.e., descendants of X)
are conditionally independent of σX given (X , pa(X)).
Justification of this assumption requires us to makes
the system “rich” enough, often by including unob-
servable variables. Figure 17 assumes that TCI ⊥
⊥ σHRT |(Age,Smo,HRT ). This means that once we
know age and smoking status of a person and, for ex-
ample, that she is not taking HRT , then it does not
matter in terms of predicting TCI whether this is by
choice or for instance because HRT is banned from
the market. This assumption has to be scrutinized
with regard to the particular intervention that is
considered and variables that are taken into account.
If, for example, smoking status was unobserved and
omitted from the graph, then the absence of an edge
from σHRT to TCI in the new graph might not be
justifiable as TCI ⊥⊥upslope σHRT |(Age,HRT ) if Figure 17
is correct (see moral graph in Figure 19). We might
even doubt the independence TCI ⊥⊥ σHRT |(Age,
Smo,HRT ) in Figure 17, for example, if it is thought
that socioeconomic background predicts HRT and
TCI in a way not captured by {Age,Smo}.
With an influence diagram constructed as above,
the distribution of all variables under an interven-
tion σX = x
′ is given by (2) with the only modifi-
cation that p(x|pa(x)) is replaced by δ{x= x′} due
to (5). This results in the well-known intervention
formula an early version of which appears in the ar-
ticle by Davis (1984) (see also Spirtes, Glymour and
Scheines, 1993; Pearl, 1993).
We want to stress that influence diagrams are
more general than causal DAGs which have become
a popular tool in epidemiology (Greenland et al.,
1999a). The assumptions underlying a causal DAG
are equivalent to those represented in an influence
diagram that has intervention nodes σv and edges
σv → v for every node v ∈ V in the DAG. The ab-
sence of directed edges from σv to any other variable
than v translates for a causal DAG to the require-
ment that all common causes of any pair of variables
have to be included in the graph. Hence, readers
who are more familiar with causal DAGs can think
of influence diagrams as causal DAGs (ignoring σX ),
but they are then making stronger assumptions. For
a critical view on causal DAGs see the article by
Dawid (2010).
4.2 Population Causal Effect
We give two definitions of causal effects that are
relevant for the present article. They are in the spirit
of similar definitions in the literature (Rubin, 1974;
Robins, 1986; Pearl, 2000; Dawid, 2002). We for-
mulate them first in terms of distribution and later
specify particular causal parameters.
A population causal effect is some contrast be-
tween the post-intervention distributions p(y|σX =
x), x ∈ X , of Y for different interventions, for ex-
ample, setting X to x1 as opposed to x2. One could
say that this is a valid target of inference if we con-
template administering a treatment to the whole
population. Most radically one can say that X has
a causal effect on Y if for some values x1 6= x2 ∈
X the two distributions p(y|σX = xi), i = 1,2, dif-
fer in some aspect. If one can estimate these post-
intervention distributions from observable data, then
one can estimate any contrast between them. When
p(y|σX = x) 6= p(y|X = x;σX = ∅) we say that the
effect of X on Y is (marginally) confounded.2 [Note
that as detailed by Greenland, Pearl and Robins
(1999b) it is important to treat confounding and
noncollapsibility as distinct concepts.] We can ad-
just for confounding if a set of variables C is ob-
served satisfying the following conditions (6) and
2Note that “reverse causation” can occur, when in fact Y
is the cause of X , in which case we also have p(y|σX = x) 6=
p(y|X = x;σX = ∅). This is relevant in case-control studies,
where it is not always ensured that X is prior to Y ; for exam-
ple, when Y is coronary heart disease and X is homocysteine
level, one might argue that existing atherosclerosis increases
the homocysteine level. We do not consider reverse causation
as confounding.
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(7) [in short we call this a sufficient set of covari-
ates (Dawid, 2002)]. Assume we know that Y ⊥⊥
σX |(X,C), that is,
p(y|C = c;σX = x)
(6)
= p(y|X = x,C = c;σX =∅),
meaning that once we know C and the value x, then
it does not make a difference whether X = x has
been observed to happen by nature or by interven-
tion. If in addition
C ⊥⊥ σX ,(7)
that is, the covariates C are pre-treatment, then the
post-intervention distribution can be consistently es-
timated from prospective data (provided C is ob-
served). The post-intervention distribution for set-
ting X to x is obtained as
p(y|σX = x)
=
∑
x′,c
p(y|c, x′;σX = x)p(x
′|c;σX = x)p(c)
(8)
=
∑
x′,c
p(y|c, x′;σX =∅)δ{x= x
′}p(c)
=
∑
c
p(y|c, x;σX =∅)p(c),
where the last step is due to (5). The quantities
p(y|c, x;σX = ∅) and p(c) can be consistently esti-
mated from prospective data on X,Y and C. As
pointed out, for example, by Clayton (2002), (8)
corresponds to classical direct standardization. The
above conditions (6) and (7) are equivalent to Pearl’s
(1995, 2000) so-called back-door criterion for causal
graphs (Lauritzen, 2000). If we cannot find a set of
covariates that satisfies (6) and (7), an alternative
is to use an instrumental variable, but we do not
consider this any further here (see Angrist, Imbens
and Rubin 1996; Didelez and Sheehan, 2007a).
Example continued. Consider again Figure 17.
We can see that C = {Age , Occ, Smo, THist} sat-
isfies (6) and (7). But these properties are also sat-
isfied for the smaller set C ′ = {Age,Smo}. Age and
Smo are independent of σHRT , as can be seen from
the moral graph in Figure 18, and together with
HRT they separate Y and σHRT as can be seen from
the second moral graph in Figure 19. This implies
that in a prospective study we can ignore Occ and
THist altogether and apply (8) to obtain the post-
intervention distribution.
Fig. 18. Moral graph on Age, Occ, Smo, THist and σ for
Figure 17.
If, instead, we were to investigate the causal effect
of smoking on TCI we might assume an influence
diagram as in Figure 20 (ignoring S). We can see by
a similar reasoning that C = {Occ} is a sufficient set
of covariates. Note that, in this case, the mediating
variable HRT must not be included in C as it does
not satisfy (7). This illustrates that the population
causal effect that is identified by conditions (6) and
(7) is an overall or total effect, for example, the effect
of smoking on TCI as potentially mediated by its
effect on HRT .
As can be seen from (8), the population causal ef-
fect depends on the distribution of C in the popula-
tion; this is not always desirable as it may mean that
we cannot carry forward the results to another pop-
ulation. Hence we consider the conditional causal
effect next.
4.3 Conditional Causal Effects
A conditional causal effect is some contrast be-
tween the post-intervention distributions conditional
on some covariates C, p(y|C;σX = x), x ∈ X (for
the moment C need not be the same as in (8), but
we get back to this). Such a conditional causal ef-
fect may be of interest if one wants to measure how
effective treatment is for a particular patient with
known characteristics such as gender, medical his-
tory, etc. It therefore seems reasonable to assume
Fig. 19. Moral graph on all variables for Figure 17.
14 V. DIDELEZ, S. KREINER AND N. KEIDING
Fig. 20. Influence diagram for TCI example with interven-
tion in ‘smoking.’
that these covariates C satisfy (7). We further as-
sume that they also satisfy (6) because otherwise
we would need to take additional suitable covariates
into account in order to apply (8), so we might as
well incorporate them immediately. Also, if C sat-
isfies both properties, the conditional causal effect
does not depend on the population distribution of
covariates. With (6) and (7) the conditional post-
intervention distribution is automatically identified
if C is observed. Note that in order to obtain the
population causal effect using (8) we can choose any
set C such that (6) and (7) are satisfied, whereas
when we consider the conditional causal effect C
could include more variables, for example, because
they are so-called effect modifiers. For example, in
Figure 17 one may be interested in the conditional
causal effect given Age, Smo and THist if the latter
is thought to predict a different effect of HRT on
TCI , even though it is not necessary to adjust for
THist to obtain the population causal effect.
As alluded to earlier, both the population but also
the conditional causal effect are “total” causal ef-
fects, when C satisfies (7), in the sense that they
include direct as well as indirect effects of X on Y ;
for example, the effect of smoking on TCI may be
moderated by HRT . A detailed treatment of this
topic is beyond the scope of this article but we re-
fer to the works of Pearl (2001), Robins (2003) and
Didelez, Dawid and Geneletti (2006) and Geneletti
(2007) for the general theory, and conditions of iden-
tifiability, of direct and indirect effects especially in
the nonlinear case.
4.4 Inference on Causal Effect
We review testing for the causal effect based on
prospective data. In the broadest sense, the causal
null hypothesis is that the post-intervention distri-
bution of Y , p(y|σX = x) (or possibly p(y|c;σX = x)
if we consider the conditional causal effect), does not
depend on the value x, that is, we do not change the
distribution of Y by setting X to different values. It
is clear from (8) that if there is no conditional causal
effect, that is, if Y ⊥⊥X|(C;σX =∅), then there is
also no population causal effect. The converse is not
necessarily true, in particular when there are differ-
ent effects in different subgroups that may happen
to cancel each other out such that there is no over-
all effect in the whole population, that is, p(y|σX =
x) is independent of x without Y ⊥⊥ X|(C;σX =
∅) being true—this is known as lack of faithfulness
(see Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines, 1993). Hence
we suggest testing Y ⊥⊥X|(C;σX = ∅) in order to
investigate the causal null hypothesis of no (condi-
tional) causal effect. If this independence can be re-
jected, then there is evidence for a conditional causal
effect, and (except in rare cases of such lack of faith-
fulness) for a population effect.
For estimation, we need to define the causal pa-
rameter of interest. Much of the causal literature
is based on the difference in expectation, leading
to the average population and average conditional
causal effect, E(Y |σX = x1) − E(Y |σX = x2) (of-
ten denoted by ACE) and E(Y |C = c;σX = x1)−
E(Y |C = c;σX = x2), respectively.
Here, we focus instead on population and condi-
tional causal odds ratios as these are invariant to
the marginal distributions and hence applicable un-
der outcome-dependent sampling, as will be seen.
Assume that Y and X are binary. The population
causal odds ratio (COR) is defined as
CORY X =
p(Y = 1|σX = 1)p(Y = 0|σX = 0)
p(Y = 0|σX = 1)p(Y = 1|σX = 0)
.
Alternatively consider the conditional CORY X(C =
c) where we condition on the set of covariates C = c,
that is,
CORY X(C = c)
=
p(Y = 1|c;σX = 1)p(Y = 0|c;σX = 0)
p(Y = 0|c;σX = 1)p(Y = 1|c;σX = 0)
.
This is distinct from the population CORY X when it
is not collapsible over C, just as for the associational
odds ratio. When a set of covariates C is sufficient to
adjust for confounding, that is, satisfies (6) and (7),
then p(Y = 1|c;σX = x) = p(Y = 1|c,X = x;σX =
∅) and hence CORY X(C) =ORY X(C). This means
we can use Corollary 3 in order to check whether
C can be reduced, that is, whether ORY X(C) and
hence CORY X(C) is collapsible over a subset of C.
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Fig. 21. DAG representing simple case-control situation.
4.5 Causal Inference in Case-Control Studies
Now we include the sampling variable S in our
considerations. Note that the targeted causal pa-
rameters do not involve S, so we only want to make
assumptions about the distribution of S under the
observational regime σX = ∅. In the simple situa-
tion of a case-control study (without matching) sam-
pling is just on the values of Y . Therefore we assume
that
S ⊥⊥ (C,X)|(Y ;σX =∅)(9)
and in addition (6) and (7). These together imply
the following factorization:
p(y, c, x, s|σX =∅)
= p(s|y;σX =∅)p(y|c, x)(10)
× p(x|c;σX =∅)p(c).
The influence diagram in Figure 21 represents slightly
stronger restrictions, as it implies S ⊥⊥ σX |Y which
does not follow from (6), (7) and (9); that is, we
do not specify any assumptions about the distribu-
tion of S under σX = x as this is not relevant to
the target of inference. We will nevertheless use in-
fluence diagrams like Figure 21 to represent jointly
our assumptions about the sampling process and the
contemplated intervention.
The data come from the distribution p(y, c, x|S =
1;σX =∅), given by
p(S = 1|y)p(y|c, x)p(x|c;σX =∅)p(c)
p(S = 1|σX =∅)
,(11)
similar to (4). The moral graph in Figure 22 includes
an edge between σX and C as the conditional dis-
tribution of C given S is not the same for different
regimes σX . Hence if individuals are selected based
on their case or control status, we cannot expect the
distribution of the covariates to be the same in a sce-
nario where the risk factor X has been manipulated
by external intervention as in a scenario where it has
been left to arise naturally.
The following theorem revisits the well-known re-
sult that the causal effect of X on Y can be tested,
and the causal odds ratio estimated, from case-control
data (Breslow, 1996). The target of inference is
CORY X(C), based on p(y|c;σX = x), which is prospec-
tive in the sense that we want to predict the effect of
manipulating X on Y after knowing C without con-
ditioning on S while we have only the retrospective
information p(y|c,S = 1;σX =∅) available. The fol-
lowing theorem allows S to depend on the covariates
C as well as on Y .
Theorem 7. Under (6), (7) and assuming S ⊥⊥
X|(C,Y ;σX =∅), we can (i) test the null hypothe-
sis of no conditional causal effect of X on Y given
C by testing X ⊥⊥ Y |(C,S = 1;σX =∅) (regardless
of the measurement scales), and (ii) consistently es-
timate CORY X(C) by estimating ORY X(C,S = 1)
(for categorical X,Y ).
Proof. (i) Earlier we argued that a test for
Y ⊥⊥ X|(C;σ = ∅) can replace a test of the null
hypothesis of no causal effect when C satisfies (6)
and (7). As S ⊥⊥X|(C,Y ;σX =∅), Theorem 6 com-
pletes the argument.
(ii) Assumptions (6) and (7) imply CORY X(C) =
ORY X(C) as explained earlier. With Corollary 4 we
see that ORY X(C,S) is collapsible over S when S ⊥⊥
X|(C,Y ;σX =∅), which completes the proof. 
In Theorem 7, as far as testing is concerned, we
are not restricted to the categorical situation and
can use as test statistic whatever seems appropriate
given the measurement scales of X,Y,C. If this in-
dependence is rejected, then there is evidence for a
causal effect. In the particular case of binary Y and
continuous X it is well known that we can still also
consistently estimate the odds ratio using a logistic
regression (Prentice and Pyke, 1979). Their result,
however, relies on the logistic link being justified,
while the results on odds ratios when X and Y are
both categorical, such as Theorem 7(ii), make no
parametric assumptions.
The set C in Theorem 7 needs to contain a suf-
ficient set of covariates so as to justify (6). But it
also needs to contain any matching variables, even
if these are not needed for (6), in order to justify
Fig. 22. Moral graph for simple case-control situation.
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Fig. 23. Influence diagram for TCI example with matched
sampling.
S ⊥⊥X|(C,Y ;σX =∅). This has been illustrated in
Figure 8, with the variable B which is not needed
to adjust for confounding. Hence, a sufficient set of
covariates and the matching variables are required
for Theorem 7 to work. However, typically a much
larger set of covariates has been observed; one can
then use Corollary 5 to reduce it without losing in-
formation, as in the following example.
Example continued. In the HRT–TCI exam-
ple, as the study design was case-control matched by
Age, we need to make sure that C contains Age . But
we already saw that C = {Age,Smo} is a set of suffi-
cient covariates. Hence, all assumptions of Theorem
7 are satisfied with this choice of C (check these on
the influence diagram in Figure 23). That is, we can
consistently estimate the causal odds ratio between
HRT and TCI given Age,Smo from the available
data.
Alternatively, if the target is the conditional causal
odds ratio given all covariates, then we can see that
with the choice of C ′ = {Age,Occ,THist ,Smo} the
conditions of Theorem 7 are satisfied; we can es-
timate the causal odds ratio HRT and TCI given
C ′ from the available data, but we can additionally
omit Occ due to the conditional odds ratio being
collapsible over this variable. Note that it is not fur-
ther collapsible over the variable THist , implying
that the causal odds ratio given C = {Age,Smo}
is different from the causal odds ratio given C ′ =
{Age,Occ,THist ,Smo}, though both conditioning
sets are sufficient to adjust for confounding under
our assumptions. As mentioned before, THist could
be an effect modifier and might therefore be in-
cluded.
Assume now that we are instead interested in the
effect of smoking (Smo) on TCI and that the as-
sumptions encoded in Figure 20 are satisfied. So
far we have targeted the conditional causal odds
Table 4
Conditional causal odds ratio between Smo and TCI given
(Age, THist)
Smoking level log-OR (stdev) OR
Never Reference
Former 0.41 (0.21) 1.51
1–10 0.89 (0.19) 2.43
11–20 0.97 (0.18) 2.65
21+ 1.19 (0.41) 3.29
ratio between exposure and response given all co-
variates; however, if we include the mediator HRT
into C, then it does not satisfy condition (7) as it is
a descendant of Smo. Hence we could consider C =
{Age , Occ, THist} and find that ORSmo,TCI (C,S)
can again be collapsed over Occ. The resulting esti-
mates are shown in Table 4. Note that these describe
the “total” effect of Smo on TCI including possible
mediation via HRT (but conditional on Age and
THist).
5. EXTENSIONS AND FURTHER EXAMPLES
In this section we consider more general data situ-
ations where the sampling depends in a less obvious
way on the outcome and possibly on further vari-
ables. In particular, we extend the previous results
to the case where a sufficient set of covariates (and
possibly matching variables) C does not allow us
to collapse over S. In such cases taking further vari-
ables into account can sometimes provide a solution.
Let us start with an example.
Example. Weinberg, Baird and Rowland (1993)
and Slama et al. (2006) considered ‘time-to-pregnancy’
studies which are of interest when investigating fac-
tors affecting fertility. Typically X is exposure, such
as a toxic substance or smoking, and Y is the time
to pregnancy; common covariates C such as age, so-
cioeconomic background, etc., may be taken into ac-
count. The problem here is that if women are sam-
pled who became pregnant during a certain time in-
terval (retrospective sampling), then long duration
to pregnancy automatically means earlier initiation
time. However, initiation time might predict the ex-
posure if it has changed over time, for example, be-
cause precautions regarding toxic substances have
increased or smoking habits in the population have
changed over time. Therefore, Y and X may be as-
sociated given C even if there is no causal effect
of exposure, that is, C is not “bias-breaking.” Note
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Fig. 24. Graphical representation of assumption in time–
to-pregnancy example.
that the same phenomenon also occurs with current
duration designs and that prospective sampling has
many other drawbacks in “time-to-pregnancy” stud-
ies as discussed in detail by Slama et al. (2006).
The key to solving this problem is to find a bias-
breaking variable Z such that either X or Y can rea-
sonably be assumed conditionally independent of S
given Z (and observed covariates) and to use Corol-
lary 3 so as to further collapse over Z. The method
proposed by Weinberg, Baird and Rowland (1993)
relies on using the time of initiation. It seems plausi-
ble that once the initiation time Z and time to preg-
nancy Y are known, the sampling S is not further as-
sociated with the exposure X , typically controlling
for relevant covariates C, that is, S ⊥⊥X|(Z,Y,C).
Further, we may sometimes be able to justify that
Y ⊥⊥Z|(X,C), that is, that the initiation time itself,
once we account for relevant factors and regardless
of whether the unit is sampled or not, should not
predict time to pregnancy. This assumption might
be violated if there are other relevant factors that
have changed over time and that are not captured
by C or X .
Using again σX as intervention indicator and as-
suming that C is a sufficient set of covariates, we
can summarize our assumptions about the time-to-
pregnancy example through the following indepen-
dencies: Z ⊥⊥ σX , Y ⊥⊥ (Z,σX)|(X,C) and S ⊥⊥
(X,σX)|(Z,Y,C). The graph in Figure 24 represents
these conditional independence assumptions (the edge
C→ Z could be replaced by C← Z). If it were not
for the retrospective sampling, the causal effect of X
on Y could be analyzed ignoring Z, as C is assumed
a sufficient set of covariates. The selection effect be-
comes apparent when checking for graph separation,
which yields a moral edge between Z and Y when
conditioning on S (cf. moral graph in Figure 26).
The following theorem shows that exploiting the
initiation time Z in the above example can indeed
facilitate inference about the causal effect.
Fig. 25. Moral graph for DAG in Figure 24 marginal over S.
Theorem 8. We can test for a (conditional)
causal effect of X on Y (given C) if there exists a
set of observable variables Z such that all following
conditions are satisfied:
(i) S ⊥⊥X|(Y,Z,C;σX =∅),
(ii) Y ⊥⊥ Z|(X,C;σX =∅),
(iii) C is a sufficient set of covariates,
(iv) the joint distribution p(y,x, z|σX =∅) is stri-
ctly positive.
The causal null hypothesis is then equivalent to Y ⊥
⊥X|(Z,C,S = 1;σX =∅).
Proof. As argued before, testing Y ⊥⊥ X|(C;
σX =∅) provides a test for the causal null hypothe-
sis. We show that it is equivalent to Y ⊥⊥X|(Z,C,S =
1;σX = ∅). As all conditional independencies are
conditional on σX = ∅ it will be omitted from the
notation.
Remember that with (i) and Theorem 6, Y ⊥⊥
X|(Z,C) is equivalent to Y ⊥⊥X|(Z,C,S = 1). First
assume that Y ⊥⊥ X|C. With (ii) we obtain Y ⊥⊥
X|(Z,C), which is equivalent to Y ⊥⊥X|(Z,C,S =
1). For the converse, assume Y ⊥⊥X|(Z,C,S = 1),
hence Y ⊥⊥X|(Z,C). Now, (iv) is sufficient to en-
sure (Lauritzen, 1996, page 29) that this conditional
independence together with (ii) yields Y ⊥⊥ (X,Z)|C
which implies Y ⊥⊥X|C. 
Example continued. Consider again the time-
to-pregnancy study represented in Figure 24. We see
that all assumptions of Theorem 8 are satisfied: C
and σ are nondescendants of each other and have no
Fig. 26. Moral graphs for the DAG in Figure 24 including S.
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parents; from the moral graph on Y,Z,X,C (Figure
25) it follows that C is a sufficient set of covariates,
and that (ii) holds, while part (i) can be seen from
the moral graph on all nodes in Figure 26. Hence
we can investigate the null hypothesis of no causal
effect by testing whether Y and X are associated
conditionally on Z and C for the sampled subjects.
Remarks. (a) Theorem 8 is symmetric in X,Y ,
in the sense that they can be swapped in (i) and (ii).
(b) If Z =∅, the conditions are the same as for the
matched case-control situation of Section 4.5 (The-
orem 7).
(c) Further, the theorem does not require that
Z ⊥⊥ σX , that is, that the bias-breaking variable Z is
not affected by an intervention in X , hence in Figure
24 the arrow from Z to X could be reversed (though
this is not plausible in the time-to-pregnancy sce-
nario that we have used, but may be relevant in
other scenarios).
It is easy to find realistic examples where the as-
sumptions of Theorem 8 are not satisfied; for ex-
ample, Robins (2001) explained why it is difficult to
identify the effect of hormone treatment on endome-
trial cancer in case-control studies. In such situa-
tions, additional outside information can sometimes
be used to obtain identifiability (see, e.g., Geneletti,
Richardson and Best, 2009).
In addition to the above result about testing the
causal effect, we also have the following about esti-
mating it when all variables are discrete.
Theorem 9. Under the assumptions of Theo-
rem 8, we can consistently estimate the (conditional)
causal odds ratio of X on Y given C, CORY X(C),
by estimating ORY X(Z,C,S = 1).
Proof. From (iii) it follows that CORY X(C) =
ORY X(C), that is, the causal odds ratio is equal to
the observational odds ratio. Further, using Corol-
lary 3 with B1 = S and B2 =Z, (i) yields ORY X(Z,
C,S) is collapsible over S in the observational regime
and (ii) means ORY X(Z,C) is collapsible over Z,
hence ORY X(Z,C,S) is collapsible over (Z,S). 
Remarks. (a) In the situation of Theorem 9 it
does not necessarily hold that ORY X(C,S = 1) =
ORY X(C), that is, Corollary 5 (with B = Z) does
not apply as neither part (i) nor part (ii) of that
corollary is satisfied. However, Corollary 5 can be
used to further reduce the set C if ORY X(C) is col-
lapsible over a subset of C. The difference between
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 27. (a) DAG and relevant moral graphs for Hernan,
Herna´ndez-Dı´az and Robins (2004) example; (b) is moral
graph on all variables, (c) on C and σX , (d) on Y,X,C and
σX .
the above Theorem 9 and Corollary 5 is that while
the latter focuses on such a reduction of dimension-
ality, the former exploits the fact that ORY X(C) is
the same in a higher dimensional model ORY X(C,
Z,S = 1). This is useful because we can only
estimate quantities conditional on S = 1 while
ORY X(C) 6=ORY X(C,S = 1).
(b) Theorem 9 implies that the assumptions of
Theorem 8 can be tested to a certain extent as they
imply that ORY X(Z = z,C,S = 1) =ORY X(Z = z
′,
C,S = 1) for z 6= z′. Hence, estimates should not
vary much for different values of Z.
We conclude with an example for potential se-
lection bias that is not due to outcome-dependent
sampling but is also covered by the conditions of
Theorem 9 due to their symmetry in X and Y .
Example. Hernan, Herna´ndez-Dı´az and Robins
(2004) considered the example illustrated in Figure
27. In a study with HIV patients X is anti-retroviral
therapy, Y is AIDS, U is the true level of immuno-
supression and C is a collection of symptoms as well
as measurements on CD4 counts. Further covariates
would typically be included but for simplicity we
omit them here. We assume X is randomized so it
has no graph parents. The fact that S depends on
C and X represents that patients with worse symp-
toms and side effects, predicted by treatment and
baseline covariates, are more likely to drop out and
not be available for the analysis. (Note that if it was
not for having to condition on S = 1, then we could
estimate the population causal effect of X on Y
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without further adjustment.) We can verify that the
odds ratio between X and Y is not collapsible over
S from Figure 27(b): neither X ⊥⊥ S nor Y ⊥⊥ S.
However, if we consider the conditional causal ef-
fect of X on Y given C, then we can collapse over
S. With Z = ∅, all conditions of Theorem 9 with
X and Y interchanged are satisfied, so we can esti-
mate CORY X(C) by using CORY X(C,S = 1); con-
dition (i) can be seen from the moral graph in Figure
27(b), condition (ii) is redundant, condition (iii) can
be seen from Figure 27(c) and (d).
6. CONCLUSION
As the sampling or selection mechanism can often
create complications and bias in statistical analyses,
we argued in Section 2.4 that the basic assumptions
about the sampling, in terms of conditional inde-
pendence, should be made explicit using graphical
models including a node for the binary sampling
indicator. We demonstrated how this allows us to
characterize, with simple graphical rules, situations
in which we can collapse the (conditional) odds ra-
tio over S (Corollary 4) or, more generally, when we
can test for a (conditional) association (Theorem 6).
Addressing specifically causal inference, Theorem 7
specifies the additional assumptions required to test
for a causal effect or estimate a (conditional) causal
odds ratio under outcome-dependent sampling, such
as in a matched case-control design. Theorems 8 and
9 extend these results to more general situations
with less obvious outcome-dependent sampling. Our
results are therefore relevant to a range of study de-
signs, case-control being the most common, but also,
for example, retrospective sampling that is condi-
tional on reaching a certain state, such as time-to-
pregnancy studies.
We have shown how different types of graphical
models can be used to express assumptions about
the sampling process, admitting more flexibility than
if restricted to causal DAGs (but as explained in Sec-
tion 4.1 our results are also valid for the latter). In
addition to directed acyclic and undirected graphs,
we want to point out that chain graphs provide a
further class of useful models. The original analy-
sis of the TCI data, for instance, used chain graphs
(Pedersen et al., 1997). The causal interpretation of
chain graphs, however, is more complicated than for
DAGs (cf. Lauritzen and Richardson, 2002).
As any type of graph only encodes presence or ab-
sence of conditional independencies, it cannot rep-
resent particular parametric assumptions or prop-
erties of the model and selection process. Conse-
quently, any inference other than testing or estimat-
ing odds ratios will typically require such additional
assumptions, which in turn will need to be scruti-
nized and complemented by a sensitivity analysis.
We therefore regard the use of graphical models in
this context as an important first step of the analy-
sis, facilitating the structuring and reasoning about
the problem of outcome-dependent sampling.
Concerning the question of causal inference, we
have mainly assumed an approach of adjusting for
confounding by conditioning on suitable covariates
in the analysis. A different way of using covariates
is via the propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983) or inverse probability weighting (Robins, Her-
nan and Brumback, 2000), but little is known as yet
on how to adapt these to case-control studies or gen-
eral outcome-dependent sampling; but see the work
of Robins, Rotnitzky and Zhao (1994, Section 6.3),
Newman (2006), Mansson et al. (2007) and van der
Laan (2008).
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